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DEADLOCK IN A CLOSE CORPORATION: A
SUGGESTION FOR PROTECTING A
DISSIDENT, CO-EQUAL SHAREHOLDER
While the courts and legislatures have devised concepts and guide-
lines for the publicly held corporation, the unique nature of the close
corporation' has produced problems untouched by, or unsuited for,
those principles. 2 The close corporation is frequently used by busi-
nessmen who seek to derive the advantages of doing business in the
corporate form while nonetheless clinging to the benefits of a partner-
ship.' Ownership and management usually coalesce with the share-
I. Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 491 (1948) notes
"that no satisfactory all-purpose definition of a close corporation appears even to have been
worked out." For a compilation of the various definitions adopted by the courts, commentators
and legislatures, see I F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02 (1971). In his treatise, Profes-
sor Rohrlich adopts the following definition ". . . the 'close corporation' [is a corporation]
wherein all the outstanding stock (there being no publicly held securities of any other class) is
owned by the persons (or members of their immediate families) who are active in the manage-
ment and conduct of the business." C. ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 4.19, at 125 (4th ed. 1967). It is Rohrlich's definition which best
defines the business entity envisioned in this Note.
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATIONS ARE USED IN THIS NOTE:
F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS (1971) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL];
C. ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (4th ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as ROHRLICH];
Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34
N.C.L. REV. 432 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Latty].
2. Dean O'Neal notes in his treatise that "[iraany corporate concepts and principles (un-
doubtedly created with public-issue corporations primarily in mind) are ill-adapted to close
corporations." I O'NEAL § 1.13, at 50. Recognition of the unique problems arising in close
corporations has led several state legislatures to adopt either provisions in addition to their
general corporate statutes specifically designed to meet the needs of close corporations or
separate, integrated close corporation statutes. As examples of the former, see N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW 620(a)-(g) (McKinney Supp. 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-73, 55-125(a) (1965).
A complete listing of the latter includes DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (Supp. 1971); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 608.70-.77 (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 100-11 (Supp. 1971). See
generally I O'NEAL § 1.14b; Hall, The New Maryland Close Corporation Law, 27 MD. L.
REV. 341 (1967); Comment, Comparison of the Close Corporation Statutes of Delaware,
Florida and New York, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 515 (1969).
Arguments have been advanced that inclusion of special provisions covering close corpora-
tions are more desirable than the passage of separate, integrated statutes. See generally Latty
455-57.
3. Commentators acknowledge this to be one of the primary goals of businessmen forming
close corporations. I O'NEAL §§ 1.07-.08; Cary, How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy Part-
nership Advantages: Planning for the Closely Held Firm, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 427 (1953). Latty
438.
4. Unlike the typical shareholder in a publicly held corporation, who may be simply
an investor or a speculator and cares nothing for the responsibilities of management,
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
holders expecting to derive much, if not all, of their income in the
form of salaries for managerial services rendered the corporation.
Viewing themselves as "partners", the shareholders often conduct the
affairs of the business with little adherence to the technical requisites
of corporate decision-making. 5 In spite of these marked differences,
the legislative and judicial reaction to the resolution of close corpora-
tion conflicts has only slowly evolved from the traditional publicly
held corporation approach;6 as a result, inequities have arisen for
which the law offers remedies which are, at best, inadequate.
The problem of "deadlock"-an impasse in corporate decisional
processes-exemplifies an area where the law now affords methods
of resolution which are largely unsatisfactory for the close corpora-
tion. 7 Although providing that disputes arising among shareholders
or directors of a corporation must be settled by the principle of
majority rule, the typical state statute also allows shareholders to
establish corporations whose charters or by-laws permit: (1) the even
division of voting shares and board membership between opposing
factions; or (2) the vesting of veto powers in minority shareholders;
or (3) the setting of high voting requirements for shareholder or
director action.8 As a result of a shareholders' agreement embodying
such provisions, the possibility of corporate deadlock is greatly en-
hanced.'
the shareholder in a close corporation is a co-owner of the business and wants the
privileges and powers that go with ownership. His participation in that particular corpo-
ration is often his principal or sole source of income. As a matter of fact, providing
employment for himself may have been the principal reason why he participated in
organizing the corporation. I O'NEAL § 1.07, at 21.
See also ROHRLICH 125.
5. Owners of small "family" corporations, or "incorporated partnerships" are
notoriously negligent in observing the legal requirements and formalities of doing busi-
ness in the corporate form. Often they are little interested in such things as minutes,
meetings and resolutions, and know nothing about such legal rules as "interested direc-
tors" and "corporate opportunity"-until the day of reckoning comes, when the "part-
nership" breaks up in dispute or creditors decide to assert their claims. Acts done
informally and in complete good faith are then tested against strict legal requirements
that the parties knew nothing about or ignored. An unhappy education results. Prentice
Hall, Lawyers Weekly Report: Corporations News (Jan. 24, 1955), reprinted in Latty
453.
6. 1 O'NEAL § 1.13, at 50-51. See, e.g., Note, Some Specific Needs of the Close Corpora-
lion Not Met Under the Minnesota Business Corporation Act: Suggestions for Statutory
Relief, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1008 (1970).
7. For a discussion of the rationale suggesting that the presently available solutions for
corporate deadlock are inadequate, see notes 25-39 infra and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of these control arrangements, see I O'NEAL §§ 4.01-5.39.
9. The possibility of deadlock led some courts to refuse to enforce shareholder agreements
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The adverse consequences of corporate deadlock-for example,
obstruction of even routine business matters, deleterious effects on
corporate borrowing, and incessant litigation1°-would perhaps be
less severe were it not for an increasing willingness among courts to
ascribe to the officers of close corporations powers which exceed
those enjoyed by their publicly held counterparts. While the same
broad principles of corporate and agency law theoretically determine
the powers of officers in both close and publicly held corporations,
the coalescence of ownership and management in the close corpora-
tion has led many courts to allow the officers of a close corporation
to exercise powers more extensive than those ordinarily allowed the
management of publicly held corporations. Analytically, these
greater powers are more closely analogous ,to those possessed by
general partners than to the powers recognized under the principles
of traditional corporate law." Under general partnership theory, each
partner has authority to bind the partnership as to any matter within
embodying control arrangements such as high vote requirements for corporate action. See, e.g.,
Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945), in which the court refused
to enforce a by-law requiring unanimous vote for director action. The court stated that such
a by-law
is, almost as a matter of law, unworkable and unenforcible for the reason given by the
Court of King's Bench in Dr. Hascard v. Dr. Somany, I Freeman 504, in 1693: "prima
facie in all acts done by a corporation, the major number must bind the lesser, or else
differences could never be determined." Id. at 119, 60 N.E.2d at 831.
Of course, the draftsmen of an agreement embodying deadlock-enhancing provisions can
easily include provisions to become effective upon the occurrence of deadlock. Such provision
could require that disputes arising among equally divided directors and shareholders be submit-
ted to arbitration. For a discussion of the merits of including an arbitration clause in the
shareholders' agreement, see O'Neal, Resolving Disputes in Closely Held Corporations: Intra-
Institutional Arbitration, 67 HARV. L. REv. 786 (1954); Note, Mandatory Arbitration as a
Remedy for Intra-Close Corporate Disputes, 56 VA. L. REv. 271 (1970); Note, Arbitration as
a Means of Settling Disputes Within Close Corporations, 63 COLuM. L. REv. 267 (1963). See
note 60 infra for additional deadlock resolution techniques.
10. 2 O'NEAL § 9.02, at 4. See, e.g., Stott Realty Co. v. Orloff, 262 Mich. 375, 376, 247
N.W. 698, 699 (1933); Nashville Packet Co. v. Neville, 144 Tenn. 698, 699, 235 S.W. 64, 65
(1921); Becker & Becker, Practical Suggestions for Financing a Business Enterprise, 112 J.
AccouNTANcy 42, 45 (Dec. 1961).
11. Jaffe v. Chicago Wiiehouse Lumber Co., 4 Ill. App. 2d 415, 124 N.E.2d 618 (1954)
(close corporation's president has power to bind the corporation to a contract to pay the
company's sales manager a bonus equal to twenty-five percent of the company's net profits);
Hartford v. Massachusetts Bowling Alleys, 229 Mass. 30, 118 N.E. 188 (1918) (treasurer given
power to employ manager for firm's business for period of one year); Barkin Const. Co. v.
Goodman, 221 N.Y. 156, 116 N.E. 770 (1917) (secretary has power to bind the company to a
contract providing that the rents from the company's property would be held by another as
security for a loan); Haff v. Long Island Fuel Corp., 233 App. Div. 117, 251 N.Y. Supp. 67
(2d Dep't 1931) (where other directors and shareholders in a close corporation have acquiesced
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the ordinary scope of the firm's business; 2 however, under corporate
theory, the corporation is the principal and the corporate officers
merely agents. 13 Appointment to a corporate office carries with it no
inherent authority to act for the corporation; 4 therefore, corporate
officers must derive whatever authority they have as agents from
either express delegation in the corporation's charter, by-laws and
resolutions of the board of directors, or from implied delegation by
in exclusive control by company's general manager, then that officer had authority to execute
promissory note without formal director authorization). The courts have seldom articulated a
difference in the rules governing officers' powers in close and publicly held corporations, yet
they appear
in fact to have often cut through the technical legal form of close corporations to reach
the results that would be reached if the enterprises were conducted as partnerships. InI
other words, the courts frequently, and perhaps usually, recognize'in officers of a close
corporation the same powers that are possessed by partners in a firm under the general
rule of partnership law which makes each partner an agent of the firm for the purposes
of its business and empowers each partner to bind the firm by acts apparently carried
on to further the usual business of the partnership. 2 O'NEAL § 8.05, at 23 (footnotes
omitted).
But see Goldenberg v. Vartell Broadcasting Corp., 47 Misc. 2d 105,262 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sup,
Ct. 1965) (absent express authority, president did not have power to bind the firm to an
employment contract providing for the issuance of corporate stock as partial compensation to
the employee); N.A. Berwin & Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 199 App. Div. 453, 191 N.Y.S. 817
(Ist Dep't 1922), affd mem., 235 N.Y. 608, 139 N.E. 754 (1923).
12. Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and
the act of every partner. . . for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of
the partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership. . . . UNIFORM PART-
NERSHIP ACT (U.L.A.) § 9(l) (West 1969).
The authority conferred by Section 9(l) of the Act is not dependent upon express or
apparent authority. Rather Section 9(1) gives a partner inherent authority to bind the
firm-authority which arises solely from the agency relationship. The Restatement (Second)
of Agency states:
Inherent agency power is a term used in the restatement of this subject to indicate the
power of an agent which is derived not from authority, apparent authority or estoppel,
but solely from the agency relation and exists for the protection of persons harmed by
or dealing with a servant or other agent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A, at
36 (1958).
13. H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 49, at 137 (rev. ed. 1946). For a detailed analysis of
the powers of corporate officers, see 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 265-785
(perm. ed. 1931).
14. See, e.g., Corporation of Amer. v. Harris, 5 Cal. App. 2d 452, 43 P.2d 307 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1935); Black v. Harrison Home Co., 155 Cal. 121, 99 P. 494 (1909); Craven v. Gazza,
36 Misc. 2d 493, 232 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1962). The view that corporate office carries with
it no inherent authority has been widely acknowledged by commentators. See BALLANTINE,
supra note 13, at § 49; Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 290, 291 (1954). But see Twyeffort v. Unexcelled
Mfg. Co., 263 N.Y. 6, 9, 188 N.E. 138, 139 (1933); Harding v. Morgan Lithograph Co., 247
N.Y. 332, 338, 160 N.E. 388, 390 (1928); 2 FLETCHER, supra note 13, at § 558; Note, Inherent




the acquiescence of the directors or shareholders in a course of con-
duct 15 or assumption of authority." Nonetheless, in recognizing a
fundamental similarity between close corporate officers and general
partners, many courts have cut through the technical form of the
close corporate structure to treat their problems in a manner more
consonant with partnership law than that of the otherwise applicable
corporate principles. The ascription of extraordinary partnership
powers to officers of close corporations, when coupled with the legis-
lative and judicial encouragement of deadlock-causing devices, in-
creases the likelihood of usurpation of corporate control by one of
the opposing shareholder factions in the event of deadlock. If allowed
to go unchecked, this usurpation of control can endanger the invest-
ment and livelihood of the excluded shareholder.17
CORPORATE LAW PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO DIRECTOR AND
SHAREHOLDER DEADLOCK
The occurrence of deadlock among equally powerful shareholders
and directors raises difficult conceptual problems in any attempt to
define the powers of officers in close corporations. For example,
absent express authority, can action by less than a majority of direc-
tors bind an officer in the exercise of his powers on behalf of the
corporation? The courts have failed to give clear answers to this
question; those decisions which have dealt with the issue, however,
have considered only the narrower question of the power of an officer
15. See, e.g., Joy v. Ditto, Inc., 356 Il1. 348, 190 N.E. 671 (1934) (alternative holding); cf
Martin v. Wegg, 110 U.S. 7 (1884). "A corporation may be bound by its custom of doing
business. It may be bound by acquiescence; it may be bound by accepting and retaining the
fruits of a transaction and in other ways without any action of its Board of Directors." First
Trust Co. v. Miller, 160 Wis. 336, 337, 151 N.W. 813, 814 (1915) (emphasis added).
16. See Joseph Greenspon's Sons Iron & Steel Co. v. Pecos Valley Gas Co., 34 Del. 567,
572, 156 A. 350, 352 (1931). "Where officers of a corporation surrender to the president the
management and control of its affairs, and permit him to exercise unrestrained authority for a
long period of time, the corporation may be liable for his acts." Allen v. France Packing Co.,
170 Pa. Super. 632, 635, 90 A.2d 289, 291 (1952).
17. Although not technically a deadlock case, Gonseth v. K & K Oil Co., 439 S.W.2d 18
(Mo. App. 1969) provides an excellent example of the damage which might befall a shareholder
who thinks he has bargained for equal control. In Gonseth, the court held that the plaintiff,
who had been an equal owner with the defendant in a partnership business that they had
transferred to a corporation, was not defrauded when the corporation issued 24 shares to the
plaintiff, 24 shares to the defendant and 2 shares to an attorney who voted with the defendant
to increase defendant's salary and to terminate the plaintiff's salary. For a discussion of "freeze-
out" techniques generally, see F. O'NEAL AND J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES: "SQuEEzE-OUTS" IN SMALL ENTERPRISES §§ 3.01-5.14 (1961).
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to institute or defend litigation.'8
One line of authority would allow officers to initiate an action
whenever necessary to prevent irreparable injury to the interests of
the shareholders 9 or the corporation itself." These decisions are
premised on the concept that, in an emergency, some person should
be empowered to act in order to protect the corporation's interests.
This line of cases supports the proposition that prohibition by less
than a majority cannot prevent an officer from acting, if his action
is essential to protect the corporation. An opposite view, however, has
been taken by courts2' which were hesitant to deprive participants in
a close corporation of the veto powers for which they bargained,
Those courts have denied officers authority to initiate or defend liti-
gation in the corporation's name when the directorate is deadlocked.2
Noting that the statutory norm provides that the business of a corpo-
ration shall be managed by its board of directors, courts adopting this
restrictive view have argued that endowing officers with power to
initiate or defend litigation would effectively amend the statute to
read that "the corporation shall be managed by its board of directors
except in the case of deadlock when it shall be managed by any
director who happens to be president."3 This second line of cases
supports the proposition that prohibition by less than a majority is
sufficient to deny an officer authority to act in the name of the
corporation.
Both lines of authority provide concepts which could be useful in
furnishing a remedy for the most common deadlock situation-that
is, when a shareholder-officer representing one faction takes an ac-
18. 2 'NEAL § 8.06.
19. Regal Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Merlis, 274 F. 915 (2d Cir. 1921).
20. See, e.g., Regal Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Merlis, 274 F. 915 (2d Cir. 1921); Lydia E,
Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 298 Mass. 59, 9 N.E.2d 573 (1937); Elblum Holding Corp. v.
Mintz, 120 N.J.L. 604, 1 A.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Durfee & Canning v. Canning, 78 R.I.
385, 82 A.2d 615 (1951).
21. Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), rev'd on other grounds, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953); Seeland Inv. Corp. v. Emprise,
Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 305, 12 Cal. Rptr. 153 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Kelly v. Citizen's Fin.
Co., 306 Mass. 531, 28 N.E.2d 1005 (1940); Sterling Indus., Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp.,
298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.2d 790 (1949).
22. See Application of Paloma Frocks, Inc., I App. Div. 2d 640, 152 N.Y.S.2d 652, 654
(Ist Dep't 1956), rev'd sub nor. Paloma Frocks, Inc. v. Shamokin Sportswear Corp., 3 N.Y.2d
572, 147 N.E.2d 779, 170 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958).




tion over the objection of a dissenting, equally-powerful second fac-
tion. Obviously, the latter line of cases denies the existence of any
implied authority in an officer to act in the face of deadlock; the
former, "emergency '2 4 line of cases likewise lends support to the
position of the dissenting faction, except where it can be shown that
the corporation is threatened by immediate, irreparable injury.
What remedies are available to a dissenting group to attack such
action by a director-officer? Perhaps the remedy most widely used by
dissident shareholders excluded from corporate management due to
the usurpation of control by a director-officer is dissolution of the
corporation. Although the corporate entity once occupied an almost
sacrosanct position in the eyes of the legislatures and the courts,25
modern dissolution-for-deadlock statutes have removed many of the
hindrances which hampered the efforts of dissident shareholders seek-
ing dissolution. 2 However, the threshold question is whether dissolu-
tion is an appropriate resolution. 27 Winding-up a close corporation is
a drastic remedy which will deny the shareholder-officers the oppor-
tunity to participate in an enterprise which has likely provided partic-
ipants with their primary source of income. Depending on local eco-
24. Ostensibly, the courts accepting the "emergency" argument, for example, would allow
a shareholder-officer to hire an employee if the officer could prove that circumstances threat-
ened the continued operation of the business. Such extraordinary circumstances might arise if
both shareholders-officers were incapacitated by illness and the corporation did not have an
employee capable of operating the business.
25. See Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and Disso-
lution, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 778 (1952).
26. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 355 (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23,
§ 104(a)(3) (Supp. 1971); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1002 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-125(a)(3) (1965); PA. STAT. tit. 15, § 1386 (Supp. 1969). For a discussion of these and
other dissolution-for-deadlock statutes, see 2 O'NEAL §§ 9.28-.29; ROHRLICH § 4.28; J.
TINGLE, THE STOCKHOLDER'S REMEDY OF CORPORATE DISSOLUTION (1959); Howe, Corporate
Divorce: Deadlock in the Close Corporation, 22 Bus. LAW. 469 (1967); Israels, supra note 25.
27. Courts have been reluctant to dissolve concerns which are being operated profitably
because of the adverse effect of dissolution on the corporation's creditors and employees.
Although largely unarticulated, the courts' concern seems to be protection of the "public's
interest." But see Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1956-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875, at 952 (reluct-
ance to order dissolution is based upon the recognition that a "formerly viable concern" might
be revived if the deadlock could be broken). In addition, other courts have recognized the
potential for abuse of the "dissolution-for-deadlock" statutes in situations where one or more
shareholders attempt to use dissolution as a technique for squeezing-out dissidents. See, e.g.,
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919) (two of three equal
shareholders voted for dissolution of a corporation so that they could acquire its assets and
operate the business without being encumbered with the dissident); O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra
note 17, at § 4.09.
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nomic conditions, a court-appointed receiver 8 may be unable to find
a buyer willing to purchase the enterprise as a going concern at a
reasonable price. Failure to find such a buyer will necessitate the
piecemeal selling of the corporation's assets, a disposition which ordi-
narily results in the realization of an amount substantially less than
if the business were sold as a going concern.
Prior to the formulation of the modern dissolution-for-deadlock
statutes, many courts were willing to afford dissident shareholders
remedies short of dissolution when an opposing faction abused or
usurped corporate control.29 If the alleged wrongdoing was not sys-
tematic or continuous," the courts have provided redress by ordering
an accounting, 31 by setting aside and cancelling wrongful acts,32 by
injunction 3 or mandamus34 to prevent future wrongs, or by some
combination of these remedies.35 The commentators, however, have
underscored the general ineffectiveness of such remedies, 36 noting the
threat they pose to the essential harmonious relationship between
shareholders of the close corporation.37 Bitter litigation between fac-
28. Under most dissolution-for-deadlock statutes there is a provision giving the court power
to appoint a liquidating receiver. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.558 (1962); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32, § 157.87 (Smith-Hurd 1954). See also MODEL BusiNEss CORPORATION Acr § 98
(1971).
29. See Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind Up a Corpo-
ration at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 49 COLUM. L. Rsv. 220, 236 (1940).
30. Systematic or continuous abuse of corporate power has been uniformly held to be
grounds for dissolution. In fact, the opinions indicate that dissolution is the only remedy for
such abuse. In re Collins-Doan Co., 3 N.J. 382, 70 A.2d 159 (1949) (where one of two equal
shareholders has usurped control and excluded the other shareholder over a period of ten years,
"there is no alternative remedy. Redress for the corporate omissions [failure to pay dividends
on stock held by excluded shareholder] may be had only by dissolution." Id. at 396, 70 A.2d
at 166); Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 II1. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960) (dissolu-
tion the only answer for ten years of exclusive control). See Sellman v. German Union Fire
Ins. Co., 184 F. 977, 979 (C.C.D. Del. 1909); Kahan v. Alaska Junk Co., 111 Wash. 39, 47,
189 P. 262, 265 (1920).
31. Enterprise Printing & Pub. Co. v. Craig, 195 Ind. 302, 144 N.E. 542 (1924).
32. See Sellman v. German Union Fire Ins. Co., 184 F. 977, 979 (C.C.D. Del. 1909).
33. Kahan v. Alaska Junk Co., Ill Wash. 39, 189 P. 262 (1920).
34. Thwing v. McDonald, 134 Minn. 148, 158 N.W. 820 (1916).
35. Id. (accounting, injunctions, mandamus, and removal of officer and director, held
adequate relief for the time being); Laurel Springs Land Co. v. Fougeray, 50 N.J. Eq. 756, 26
A. 886 (1893), rev'g, 50 N.J. Eq. 185, 24 A. 499 (Ch. 1892) (accounting, setting aside improper
transactions, mandamus, and order to directors to declare dividends of all net earnings not
needed for legitimate purposes of the corporation, held adequate relief). See Hornstein, supra
note 29, at 236 n.1 17.
36. See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 29, at 236-37.
37. A close corporation is no less susceptible to deadlock than a partnership; furthermore,
the ultimate success of both rests upon the unarticulated premise that the parties have confid-
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tions necessarily undermines that relationship.38
The apparent inability of these remedies to afford dissident share-
holders a meaningful method to redress usurpation of control by an
opposing faction suggests that it would be fruitful to look beyond
these ordinary corporate principles. Because the courts have impli-
citly recognized, in officers of close corporations, authority analo-
gous to that possessed by members of partnerships, 39 an examination
of the principles applied in the resolution of disagreements in a two-
member partnership might be helpful.
RIGHTS OF THE DISSIDENT IN A Two-MEMBER PARTNERSHIP
The authority of a partner to bind his firm, of course, is a matter
subject to prior agreement among the partners; 0 in the absence of
agreement, however, the Uniform Partnership Act4 provides that
"[e]very partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its
business, and the act of every partner . . . for apparently carrying
on in the usual way the business of the partnership of which he is a
member binds the partnership .. .. -2 In the event of dispute among
partners over matters which are within the ordinary scope of the
partnership business, the Act provides for majority rule;43 however,
the Act does not expressly address itself to disagreements arising in
a two-member partnership. The absence of a statutory resolution
crystalizes the conceptual problem: under agency theory, what is the
effect of a dissent from the exercise of the existing authority, pos-
sessed by each general partner, to bind the firm in matters within the
ence in and will cooperate with one another. In the absence of reasonable prospects for such a
harmonious relationship, it seems unlikely that a partnership, and more clearly, a close corpo-
ration would ever be created. In choosing the corporate form, neither party (or faction) would
have invested in the enterprise if he had known or foreseen that the power of exclusive manage-
ment would fall to the other or that his own participation would become distasteful. It is of
special significance that the parties contemplated harmonious joint management after the
manner of partners. It is, however, this very desire which the choice of the corporate form,
accompanied by a concommitant failure to recognize the greater inherent potential for usurpa-
tion of control, often makes vain. J. TINGLE, supra note 26, at 75.
38. Hornstein, supra note 29, at 236-37.
39. See note I I supra and accompanying text.
40. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AT § 9(4); J. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP 275 (2d ed. 1952).
41. The Uniform Partnership Act was drafted and approved in 1914 by the Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 5 (1969). Since 1914, forty-
four jurisdictions have adopted the Act in substantially unmodified form. 6 UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 5 (Supp. 1972).
42. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9(1) (West 1969).
43. Id. § 18(h).
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ordinary scope of the partnership business? Is an explicit authoriza-
tion by both partners a prerequisite to binding the firm; or may either
partner, by his dissent, bar the proposed action?
Because of the relative ease with which a partnership can be dis-
solved,44 the issue posited above has been infrequently litigated. 5 A
substantial majority of the cases which have dealt with the problem
have held that a dissent by an equal partner terminates the statutory
authority of a copartner as agent and forces the third party to rely
solely on the credit of the partner dealing with him.4" Thus, in De
Santis v. Miller Petroleum Co.," a decision under the Uniform Part-
nership Act, the court held that an equal partner, having communi-
cated to a supplier his refusal to be held liable for the purchase price
of certain equipment ordered by his copartner, was not liable for any
part of the purchase price even though the equipment was subse-
quently delivered and used solely for the benefit of the partnership.
The rationale of the court focused on the communicated disclaimer
of liability, equating the disclaimer with a bar to the copartner's
authority to act for the partnership. Decisions preceding and follow-
ing De Santis have uniformly required that the disclaimer be made
by an equal partner or by a partner vested with veto powers and be
communicated by the dissenting partner to the third party prior to
the latter's injurious reliance upon the authority of the contracting
partner."' In Summers v. Dooley,9 however, the Idaho Supreme
Court recently ruled that an equal partner in a two-man partnership
did not have authority, over the objection of his copartner, to hire a
44. See id. § 31.
45. For a discussion of the cases which have examined the issue, see Note, The Permissible
Conduct of a Partner in Carrying on the Firm Business, 20 COLUM. L. REv. 66 (1929); 1960
DUKE L.J. 150.
46. De Santis v. Miller Petroleum Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 679, 85 P.2d 489 (Dist. Ct. App.
1938); Leavitt v. Peck, 3 Conn. 124 (1819); Summers v. Dooley, 94 Idaho 87, 481 P.2d 318
(1971); Knox v. Buffington & Co., 50 Iowa 320 (1879); Dawson Blakemore & Co. v. Elrod,
105 Ky. 624,49 S.W. 465 (1899); Bull v. Harris, 57 Ky. 195 (1857); Yeager v. Wallace, 57 Pa.
365 (1868); Bank of Bellbuckle v. Mason, 139 Tenn. 659, 202 S.W. 931 (1918). Some courts
have reached the same results without relying on agency theory. St. Louis Brewing Ass'n v.
Elmer, 189 Mo. App. 197, 175 S.W. 102 (1915) (since one partner has the power to dissolve
the partnership by notice, thereby preventing the making of any further contracts in the firm's
name, the dissident partner should also be able to protect himself by notice against particular
contracts); Monroe v. Conner, 15 Me. 178 (1838) (since a partner can bind the firm by his
conduct, he should be able to terminate such liability by disclaimer).
47. 29 Cal. App. 2d 679, 85 P.2d 489 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938).
48. See cases cited note 46 supra.
49. 94 Idaho 87, 481 P.2d 318 (1971).
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new employee. Although the copartner's dissent was communicated
solely to his partner and not to the employee, it was held sufficient,
as between the partners, to prevent the contracting partner from
charging the dissenting copartner with his share of the costs incurred
as a result of the unilateral decision. Both De Santis and Summers
support the assertion that authorization by less than a majority is no
authorization at all. In National Biscuit Co. v. Stroud,5" a North
Carolina decision applying the Uniform Partnership Act, the court
interpreted the language of the statute somewhat differently than the
courts in De Santis and Summers. The North Carolina court ruled
that a dissenting copartner cannot avoid personal liability for the acts
of his partner, even though the dissenter communicates his disclaimer
to the third party. Reasoning that the Act required majority rule
while simultaneously vesting each partner with equal management
rights, the court held that the dissenting partner could not restrict his
copartner's authority to act on matters within the ordinary scope of
the partnership's business. In other words, prohibition by less than a
majority is not an effective prohibition.
Writers who have dealt with even divisions in partnerships have
almost uniformly accepted the view expounded in De Santis and
Summers5 -that action by less than a majority cannot bind the part-
nership. In his treatise, Story takes the position that a disagreement
among equal partners results in a "temporary suspension of the right
of authority of each (partner) to carry on or manage the partnership
business."52 The rationale for allowing disagreement to dictate re-
moval of authority is that permitting each of the dissenting partners
to continue to transact the firm's business might allow over-com-
mitment of the partnership assets, for which dissolution is the only
remedy. 3
50. 249 N.C. 467, 106 S.E.2d 692 (1959).
51. F. BURDICK, PARTNERSHIP 232-33 (3d ed. 1917); CRANE, supra note 40, at 277-78; W.
GEORGE, PARTNERSHIP 159 (1897); E. GILMORE, PARTNERSHIPS 368 (1911); N. LINDLEY, PART-
NERSHIP 403 (4th ed. 1881); W. SHUNIAKER, PARTNERSHIP 172 (2d ed. 1912); J. STORY, PART-
NERSHIP § 123 (7th ed. 1881).
52. Id. § 23.
53. In cases of an even distribution of the partners as to whether or not an act within the
scope of the business should be done, of which disagreement a third person has knowledge, it
seems that logically no restriction can be placed upon the power to act. The partnership being
a going concern, activities within the scope of the business should not be limited, save by the
expressed will of the majority deciding a disputed question; half of the members are not a
majority. In practical operation application of such a solution to projected transactions might




Corporate statutes which require majority rule to control corpo-
rate decisions but simultaneously allow voting arrangements which
make that majority difficult to attain have enhanced the likelihood
of close corporation deadlock. Until the legislatures undertake to
amend the statutes,54 the burden is left with the judiciary to find a
solution which logically comports with the parties' intentions at the
time of corporate formation. Given the common features shared by
the close corporations and the partnership, it may be that partnership
theory provides the most hopeful direction for this pursuit.
While extension of partnership deadlock concepts to deadlocks
arising in close corporations presents difficult theoretical problems,
the courts have already deemed it expedient to apply partnership
principles to close corporations. This extension has been accom-
plished by recognizing, in the officers of such entities, authority inher-
ent in the mere possession of corporate office.5" The recognition of
this authority, while consistent with the reality of the coalescence of
ownership and management as well as the expectations of the parties,
vests the officer of a close corporation with extraordinary authority;
however, the other shareholder lacks the safeguards necessary to
protect his investment in the enterprise. Though the corporate entity
shields the individual shareholder from personal liability on corporate
obligations, a mechanism is needed whereby a dissenting equal share-
holder can protect his investment and livelihood by disclaiming the
corporation's liability. It is suggested that this end could be achieved
by allowing a shareholder who has bargained for equal control of the
enterprise to disavow corporate liability by communicating to inter-
ested third parties his dissent to a particular act. Having recognized
in the officers of close corporations the authority to bind the entity
as if they had the power of general partners, the courts-at least in
those states recognizing the effectiveness of a disclaimer 5 6-should be
willing to extend to the dissident shareholder the same method of self-
an extent needed for the transaction of business, and if on disagreement known to third persons,
each is to be considered as capable of acting, so as to bind the other, the firm may be put into
the position of being disastrously overstocked with goods, services, or other things. In its
practical workings, the better rule appears to be that in case of even disagreement, known to
third persons, no action new or positive can be taken until the partners themselves reach a
solution. CRANE, supra note 40, at 277-78.
54. See note 1I supra and accompanying text.
55. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
56. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1972:653
DEADLOCK
protection that is enjoyed by a dissident partner.
The extension of the right to disclaim corporate liability has dis-
tinct advantages over the remedies recognized under traditional cor-
porate principles. With the exception of the extraordinary remedies
of injunction and mandamus,5 7 the corporate remedies require that
the corporation actually be injured before the dissident shareholder
can seek redress. Moreover, all of the corporate remedies require that
the dissident shareholder take the initiative in bringing suit against
the other shareholder. Consequently, it is the dissident, acting
through a derivative action,58 who must bear the burden of blocking
or redressing wrongs committed against the corporation. Assuming
that the dissident shareholder can block the payment of corporate
funds,59 the recognition of a right of disclaimer would shift the burden
to the shareholder who favors an action which changes the status quo.
If a shareholder acted in the face of a communicated dissent, he
would have to prove his authority in a court proceeding for an ac-
counting or for mandamus to require execution of corporate duties.
Likewise, once the right to disclaim corporate liability is established,
57. A derivative action has some disadvantages. In New York, for example, the shareholder
bringing suit on behalf of the corporation must meet the requirements of that state's security-
for-expense statute. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1970). At least one state
court has recognized the inequity of requiring an equal shareholder to bring his suit derivatively.
Funk v. Spalding, 74 Ariz. 219, 246 p.2d 184 (1952) (a "partner" in a two-member "incorpo-
rated partnership" can maintain an action for an accounting in his own right, rather than
requiring him to resort to a derivative action).
58. In the normal two-man or two-faction close corporation, the shareholders"agreement
or the corporations' by-laws will provide that the corporate offices be divided among the
shareholders: one will be President-Vice President while the other serves as Secretary-
Treasurer. Likewise, the agreement or by-laws will require that both officers sign checks or
drafts drawn on the corporation. Such a provision would give the dissident shareholder "power
of the purse" to block the outflow of corporate funds.
59. An argument could be made to allow a dissident shareholder to communicate an
effective disclaimer to a third party even after a contract has been entered into between the
third party and a corporation's officer acting beyond his authority. To allow a dissident share-
holder power to disclaim corporate liability only when he learns of his "partner's" unauthorized
actions prior to the execution of a contract may deprive the dissenting shareholder of effective
relief. The shareholder favoring action could easily circumvent the right of disclaimer by
conducting the negotiations and executing the contract in secret. Of course, the courts should
be unwilling to allow a dissident shareholder to protect his interest at the expense of an innocent
third party, but the courts could serve the interests of both the dissident and the third party by
fashioning a remedy which stops performance under the unauthorized contract while it gives
the third party the "benefit of the bargain." Such a remedy would make the innocent third party
whole and, at the same time, would limit the potential liability of the corporation. If allowed
such a remedy, the dissident shareholder could protect the corporation from "being disastrously
overstocked with goods, services or other things." See CRANE, supra note 40.
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third parties who have notice of a dissent must either refrain from
transacting business with the corporation or act solely in reliance
upon the individual credit of the contracting shareholder." Such a
remedy should significantly diminish foreseeable harmony-disrupting
litigation since, instead of a burden to block action resting on the
shareholder who opposes action, a burden to justify affirmatively
the authority to act will rest on the shareholder who favors action.
60. In several states, the legislatures have recognized the deadlock potential inherent in
allowing high vote arrangements and have authorized their courts to exercise extraordinary
powers in the event of deadlock. Some states authorize their courts to appoint a deadlock-
breaking provisional director, see CAL. CORP. CODE § 819 (West 1955); VERNON'S Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 351.323 (1966). Other states provide for the appointment of a custodian, see DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(b) (Supp. 1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94 (Supp. 1968). Court
ordered buy-out of dissenting shares at a price judicially determined to be fair is also provided
in several states, see CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 4658-59 (West 1955); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-
384 (Supp. 1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 109(c) (Supp. 1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-22.23
(Supp. 1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-81 (1966). See Folk, supra note 27, at 954-56.
